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Abstract 
A conceptual storage model based on Hadoop is proposed in order to solve the security problems such as transmission, data 
storage, and data verification in distributed networks. The model is meant for private cloud of an organization and allows the 
organization to store data ranging from confidential to public on the same cloud. The proposed model for cloud storage 
segregates data based on roles in the hierarchy of the organization having access to the data. In addition, it takes into account how 
valuable the data is for the organization and number of times the data has been accessed within a certain period of time. The 
model is a combination of Role Based Access Control and Hadoop Distributed File System, and employs a normalization 
technique to utilize the resources efficiently by evenly distributing data over different servers. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Cloud computing is an Internet based development that provides IT-based services over the Internet. Cloud 
computing, a software concept, is an extension of grid computing and distributed computing. It mainly relies on 
resource sharing which makes it highly scalable over large scale distributed systems. It is realized mainly through 
virtual technology, which is classified into single virtualization and multiple virtualization [1]. The single 
virtualization makes a single machine to virtually work as multiple machines working together. VMware is an 
example for single machine virtualization. Multiple machine virtualization connects multiple machines through a 
control center and makes them work like one machine. Hadoop is an example for multiple machine virtualization. 
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Because of the rapid growth of cloud computing [2, 3], Big Data has become ubiquitous and crucial in numerous 
application domains, thus leading to significant challenges from data management perspective [4, 5]. Cloud 
computing is evolving from a single private cloud to a complex cloud ecosystem, bringing in picture new settings 
such as multiple cloud or cloud federations that involve end users, Service providers (SP), and Infrastructure 
Providers (IP). The evolution has introduced many challenges in terms of security, trust, risk, eco-efficiency, cost 
and legal issues. Cloud storage systems provide application-level security, and involve different components that 
authenticate and process user requests. The components execute with sufficient privileges to access any user's data. 
Based on the credentials of the user, each component is responsible for authorizing the request. OpenStack Swift [6] 
and a few publicly available cloud storage systems make use of this architecture. Further, logged-in user can store 
data in cloud without any additional storage media and can have access to the same data anywhere and anytime. 
Cloud disk can make storage simple, fast and convenient but users are not allowed to upload confidential data 
because of security reasons. The security problems of cloud disk are quite common in cloud computing [7]. Security 
challenges exist for three services of cloud SaaS, PaaS, IaaS. The threats being faced from different aspects are 
analyzed and summarized in [8, 9]. The security of cloud storage becomes weak due to the following reasons: 
1. Transmission security: Data can be intercepted while being transmitted in cloud, because of the use of 
weak encryption protection. 
2. Access control: Since the user data is stored in cloud without setting access authority, the user loses 
absolute right to monitor the data. 
3. Data storage: Once the data has been uploaded, it is stored in a distributed manner and the user is unaware 
of the specific position of data. Since confidential data and non-confidential data stored are not classified, it 
may cause data leakage. 
4. Data verification: Cloud makes no verification and inspection on the data being uploaded. It cannot 
guarantee that the uploaded data corresponds to the right user's data or the original data from the user. 
Top ten Big Data security and privacy challenges are discussed in [10]. The scientific challenges faced by cloud 
security have been discussed in survey articles [11, 12]. Based on the security threats discussed in [10, 11, 12], we 
propose a model for private cloud of an organization that stores the data by considering the role hierarchy of the 
organization and many other parameters.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related work. Section 3 describes the 
conceptual model with the assumptions made. Section 4 explains the algorithms proposed for storing data in cloud 
and Section 5 analyzes the results of the model over different data sets. Section 6 discusses the conclusion and future 
work. 
2. Related work 
Hadoop is an Apache open source project which consists of Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS), 
MapReduce, HBase, Hive, ZooKeeper and other projects [13]. Its main components are HDFS and MapReduce. 
MapReduce aims at paralleling and deals with tasks on a large scale, which makes MapReduce scheduler become 
particularly important [14]. HDFS is an open source project of Google distributed file system (GFS) [15], and has 
high fault tolerance and data access control. We use Hadoop's HDFS for cloud storage. As Hadoop lacks safety 
measures, Kerberos was integrated into Hadoop in 2009 by yahoo. The user has to obtain access certification from 
third party center for key issues before accessing Hadoop cluster, and it greatly reduces the risk of user's data 
leakages. 
Batten et al. [16] focus on preventing information harvesting in cloud data storage. The information harvesting 
problem is of major concern to cloud customers, cloud business center, and cloud data storage center. Data stored in 
the storage center may be highly confidential and come from a multitude of customers. The staff in the data storage 
center has access to the data, and hence can steal identities for compromising cloud customers. The authors propose 
an efficient method of data storage which prevents the staff from accessing and stealing data. Large Iterative 
Multiplier Ensemble (LIME) classifier model has been proposed by Abawajy et al. [17] for information security of 
Big Data. LIME classifier is a four-tier classifier for detection of malware in Big Data. They are automatically 
generated as iterative multi-tier ensembles. Zhang et al. [18] proposed the use of HDFS to build a private enterprise 
cloud suitable for big data. 
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For secure scheduling of big data applications in cloud computing, Liu et al. [19] proposed an iterative 
hierarchical key exchange scheme. The privacy preservation over big data on cloud is considered in [20]. Qinghua et 
al. [21] put forth a method on protection of user data privacy in cloud storage platform. Yu et al. [22] encrypt the 
cloud data using attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme, which defines a public key for each attribute associated 
with the data file. These public keys are used to encrypt the data files before they are uploaded. This scheme ensures 
the safety of data storage, and at the same time, the server has no need to keep a public key for each user. Chang et 
al. [23] implement access-control by identifying the users with image processing methods, such as face recognition, 
and fingerprint recognition. Jing et al. [24] proposed a cloud-disk storage based on Hadoop, by adopting principles 
from Kerberos authorization process. 
Factor et al. [25] proposed a model, Secure Logical Isolation for Multitenancy (SLIM), that provides an 
orthogonal tenant isolation mechanism over existing application-level security. The model makes use of the Linux 
process isolation mechanisms for providing isolation. 
3. Conceptual model 
We propose a model that aims at segregating data in cloud into classes by evaluating the storage criticality of 
each file. The proposed model is intended for unstructured data that may include text files, binary files, image, audio 
etc. The model is meant for private cloud of an organization, and it requires the hierarchy model of the organization 
as well as the weight associated to each role in the hierarchy. For each file being stored, the following information is 
associated with it: 
x Lowest role in the hierarchy which has access to the file 
x External criticality of the file which shows how valuable the file is for organization 
x Number of times the file is being accessed in a time period of 24 hours 
To evaluate the storage criticality of a file, we have followed proportionality measure of storage criticality (SC) 
with respect to the above mentioned inputs: 
To evaluate the storage criticality (SC) of a file, we have following proportionalities of storage criticality 
with above mentioned inputs: 
x Greater the value of external criticality (EC), the more security the file needs, as file is more 
valuable for the organization: 
SC v EC 
x All the roles lying above the lowest role having access to a file will also have access to the file. 
Thus, file needs less security in order to make the intra-organization access easier. Hence, SC is 
inversely proportional to the sum of role weights (RW) of roles from the top of the hierarchy to the 
lowest role in hierarchy having access to the file: 
SC v 1/σ ܴܹሺ݅ሻ௅௜ୀଵ , where L is the number of levels of security classes. 
x More the number of times the file is accessed (denoted by access number (AN)), the more security 
the file needs as it is being accessed frequently in a time period of 24 hours. Hence, 
SC v AN 
x To normalize the proportionality of storage criticality with AN, we identify maximum of access 
number (MAN) and the relationship between SC and MAN is as follows: 
SC v 1/MAN 
 
Combining the above four proportionalities, the final value of storage cr iticality for a file x is given as 
follows: 
ܵܥሺݔሻ ൌ ா஼ሺ௫ሻௌோሺ௫ሻ ൅
ே஺ሺ௫ሻ
ெே஺ሺ௫ሻ    , where ܴܵሺݔሻ ൌ σ ܴܹሺ݅ሻ
௅
௜ୀଵ    (1) 
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Let SC obtained by using the above formula lies in range [0, N]. If we have K security classes, their 
boundary values will be [0, N/K], [N/K, 2N/K], [2N/K, 3N/K] ,…,[(K-1)N/K, N]. However, the number of 
files will be more in lower classes and less in higher classes, leading to relatively over-utilization of 
resources in lower classes and under-utilization of resources in higher classes. Hence, to overcome this 
shortcoming we propose the idea of normalizing the storage criticalities and we used cumulative probability 
distribution function. The normalization works as follows: 
x For a given storage criticality x, identify the total number of files with SC = x. Let Nx be the number 
of files with storage criticality x, and let N be the total number of files being stored in the server. 
x Find probability of SC = x 
P(x) = Nx/N      (2) 
x Evaluate the cumulative probability for SC = x: 
ܥܲሺݔሻ ൌ σ ܲሺ݅ሻ௫௜ୀ଴       (3) 
 
x Let K be number of storage classes to be built. Hence, replace SC = x with CP(x) * K. 
 
Following the above algorithm, the new boundary value of storage criticalities o f security classes are [0, 1], 
[1, 2],. . ., [k-1, k]. The algorithm further ensures even distribution of files in each security class, thus 
leading to optimal utilization of resources. 
4. Experimental setup 
For the experimental purposes, we build our own name node having functionalities quiet similar to 
NameNode of HDFS. We performed experiments over data sets of 1000, 10000 and 100000 files, where 
each file had following values of the aforementioned parameters: 
x External Criticality (EC): [1, 1000] 
x Number of Roles in Hierarchy model: 20 
x Weight of each role (RW): [1, 100] 
x Access Number for a file: [0, 2000] 
Number of security class in which data to be stored is taken as 5. Thus name node had 5 servers, with each 
server having 1000 racks and each rack having 1000 data nodes. For experiment s, a buffer is also required 
whose threshold capacity is one-tenth of the total number of files present in the server. The experiment is 
performed on a system with dual core processor with 2.2 GHz clock speed, 3GB RAM and 64-bit Windows7 
OS. The pseudocode for normalizing the storage criticality using cumulative distribution function is given in 
Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1: Cumulative Distribution Normalization Function 
file_dir Å Directory of files where key is file name and value is file’s storage_criticality.  
criticality_count Å Directory where key is a storage_criticality, say S, and value is number of files having storage_criticaly equal to 
S. 
ciritcs Å list to store all the storage_critcality value 
N Å Total number of files in fiel_dir 
for file in file_dir.keys() do 
     if file_dir[file] not in keys of criticality_count.keys() 
     then 
 criticality_count[file_dir[file]] =1 
     else: 
 criticality_count[file_dir[file]] = criticality_count[file_dir[file]]+1 
     end if 
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end for 
for k in criticality_count.keys() do 
     criticality_count[k]=criticality_count[k]/N 
     critics.append(criticality_count[k) 
end for 
Sort(critics) 
for i=1 to critics.length() – 1 do 
    criticality_count[critics[i]] = criticality_count[critics[i]] +criticality_counr[critics[i -1]] 
end for 
for k in criticality_count.keys() do 
      criticality_count[k] = criticality_count[k]*5 
end for 
return criticality_count. 
Algorithm 2 is used to evaluate the storage criticality and it calls algorithm 1 for normalizing the same.  
Algorithm 2: Role and Access Based Data Segregation  
f Å file to be stored in the server  
file_dir Å directory holding name of each file and its normalized criticality and server allocated to it  
external_critic Å external criticality of file f. 
buffer_threshold Å threshold size of buffer 
buffer_count Å Number of files in buffer 
master_node Å masterNode of proposed file distribution system 
if buffer_count < buffer_threshold 
then 
       server = (external_critic/500) mod 5 
       master_node.add_file(f, server) 
       buffer_count+=1 
else 
      normalized_files = cumulative_distribution_function 
      for file in file_dir do 
 if 0 ≤normalized_files[file] ≤ 1 
 then 
         server=0 
 else if 1 < normalize_files[file] ≤ 2 
 then 
          server=1 
 else if 2 < normalize_files[file] ≤ 3 
 then 
           server=2 
 else if 3< normalize_files[file] ≤ 4 
 then 
        server=3 
 else if 4 < normalize_files[file] ≤ 5 
 then 
         server=4 
 end if 
if file_dir[file].server!= server 
then  
       master_node.shift_file(file, server) 
else 
       file_dir[file].criticality = normalized_files[file] 
end if 
end for 
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5. Results 
We tested Algorithm 2 on data sets of 1000, 10000 and 100000 files and evaluated the number of files 
stored under five levels of security classes before and after normalizing the storage criticality.  
               Table1: File distribution for unnormalized and  normalized SC for 1000 files dataset.  
 Unnormalized SC Normalized SC 
   
Level of 
security 
class 
Lower 
boundary 
value 
Upper 
boundary 
value 
Number of 
files 
stored 
Lower 
boundary 
value 
Upper 
boundary 
value 
Number of 
files 
stored 
Level V >80 ≤ 100 20 >4 ≤ 5 200 
Level IV >60 ≤ 80 20 >3 ≤ 4 200 
Level III >40 ≤ 60 19 >2 ≤ 3 202 
Level II >20 ≤ 40 133 >1 ≤ 2 198 
Level I ≥ 0 ≤ 20 808 ≥ 0 ≤ 1 200 
 
Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 show the file distributions belonging to different levels of security classes under the 
servers with unnormalized and normalized storage criticalities for 1000, 10000, and 100000 files dataset 
respectively. 
Table 2: File distribution for unnormalized and  normalized SC for 10000 files dataset 
 Unnormalized SC Normalized SC 
Level of 
Security 
class 
Lower 
boundary 
value 
Upper 
boundary 
value 
Number of 
files 
stored  
Lower 
boundary 
value 
Upper 
boundary 
value 
Number of 
files 
stored  
       
Level V >80 ≤ 100 230 >4 ≤ 5 2001 
Level IV >60 ≤ 80 216 >3 ≤ 4 2000 
Level III >40 ≤ 60 193 >2 ≤ 3 2000 
Level II >20 ≤ 40 1402 >1 ≤ 2 1999 
Level I ≥ 0 ≤ 20 7959 ≥ 0 ≤ 1 2000 
       
   Table 3: File distribution for unnormalized and  normalized SC for 100000 files dataset 
 Unnormalized SC Normalized SC 
Level of 
Security 
class 
Lower 
boundary 
value of SC 
Upper 
boundary 
value of SC 
Number of 
files 
stored  
Lower 
boundary 
value of 
SC 
Upper 
boundary 
value of 
SC 
Number of 
files 
stored  
Level V >80 ≤ 100 2006 >4 ≤ 5 20015 
Level IV >60 ≤ 80 1956 >3 ≤ 4 19982 
Level III >40 ≤ 60 1966 >2 ≤ 3 19981 
Level II >20 ≤ 40 13962 >1 ≤ 2 20011 
Level I ≥ 0 ≤ 20 80110 ≥ 0 ≤ 1 20011 
 
    
   From the results, it can be inferred that when the storage criticality is not normalized, the servers of security 
classes at level I and II are over-utilized. However, using the proposed normalization methodology, the files are 
distributed evenly across all the levels of security classes. 
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6. Conclusion and future works 
The following conclusions are derived from the experiments: 
1. The normalization ensures even distribution of files over different security servers resulting in efficient 
utilization of resources. 
2. When the data set is quite large, the normalization function is called iteratively thereby resulting in                
re-evaluation of storage criticality 
3. As the number of times a file is accessed changes every 24 hours, the storage criticality of the file changes 
resulting in dynamic storage of the file, thus ensuring more security to the file system. 
Future work for the proposed model is to go for its practical implementation in Hadoop Framework. Furthermore, 
the periodic normalization of storage criticality results in an overhead. To overcome the overhead, the threshold 
capacity of the buffer is to be modified to different values so as to perform minimum number of normalizations. We 
can also look for optimization of MapReduce task to overcome the induced overhead. The future work also involves 
identifying more parameters for evaluating storage criticality so as to make the formula more accurate and reliable. 
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